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Judicial Review: The United States 
Supreme Court Versus the German 
Constitutional Court 
INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review is the means by which a court determines the accept-
ability of a given law or other official action on grounds of compatibility 
with constitutional forms. 1 The German Constitutional Court ("Consti-
tutional Court") and the United States Supreme Court ("Supreme 
Court") differ significantly, and this disparity is most evident in their 
respective roles of judicial review. Since the nature and scope of judi-
cial review inevitably varies from one system to another, a comparative 
framework must allow for all pertinent distinctions. 2 This framework 
includes an examination of the interpretive tasks faced by the Supreme 
Court and the Constitutional Court in the context of their relations 
with other domestic political institutions.3 Such an examination re-
quires an evaluation of the actual political characteristics and practices 
of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court and of the domes-
tic institutions to which these courts are related.4 
The ability of each of these Courts to interpret and develop their 
respective constitutions, and thus to utilize judicial review, depends on 
certain factors inherent in a comparative analysis.5 First, the extent of 
the Court's own jurisdiction is important in this determination.6 Sec-
ond, the doctrines and attitudes concerning judicial decisions over 
certain kinds of political questions have implications on the roles of 
the Courts. 7 Third, the Courts are affected by the prevailing philosophy 
1 See C. Neal Tate, Comparative judicial Review and Public Policy: Concepts and Overview, in 
CoMPARATIVEjumciAL REvmw AND PUBLIC PoucY 3, 4 (Donald W.Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 
1992). 
2 See Donald W. Jackson, Original Intent, Strict Construction, and judicial Review: A ~Framework 
for Comparative Analysis, in CoMPARATIVE jUDICIAL REviEw AND PuBLIC PoLICY, supra note 1, at 
179, 179-80. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See PHILIP M. BLAIR, FEDERALISM AND jUDICIAL REVIEW IN WEST GERMANY 26 (1981). 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
123 
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regarding the methods of legal interpretation.8 Fourth, the nature of 
the constitution which the Court is called upon to interpret influences 
the role of the Court.9 
This Note compares the Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Court with a specific focus on their judicial review functions. In order 
to provide an adequate comparison, this Note examines the system of 
judicial review in each country and the Courts' roles within their 
respective governmental frameworks. Part I defines judicial review and 
examines its importance in modern society. Part II provides an over-
view of the American and German systems of judicial review, and it 
focuses on the differences between centralized and decentralized sys-
tems. Part III reviews the respective histories of the Courts and judicial 
review in Germany and the United States. Part IV discusses and com-
pares the roles of the United States Supreme Court and the German 
Constitutional Court. Finally, this Note concludes with an analysis of 
the two systems of judicial review. This includes an examination of the 
benefits and detriments of both systems in light of their respective 
political foundations and backgrounds. 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW GENERALLY 
Judicial review is the power of the courts to decide upon the consti-
tutionality of legislative acts. 10 A comparative analysis of judicial review 
demonstrates that the institution can be implemented in many ways, 
and the notion of judicial review represents a fascinating synthesis of 
contradictory schools of thought. 11 The different means by which judi-
cial review is employed also contributes to an amplified understanding 
of our own psychological responses to the tyrannies of our time. 12 
The written constitutions and the subordination of statutory law to 
those constitutions by courts represent innovations with deep historical 
and philosophical roots. 13 From the earliest times, men have sought to 
create or discover a hierarchy of laws and to ensure observance of this 
hierarchy. 14 This search is essentially a perpetual human attempt to find 
something immutable in the continuous change that constitutes des-
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
IO ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS,jUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAw 1 (D.F. Bur ed., 1989). 
II See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE jUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 117 (Paul j. 
Kollmer & Joanne M. Olson eds., 1989). 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 Id. 
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tiny. 15 Laws will inevitably change, but the Higher Law, which reflects 
society's fundamental values, must remain. 16 A law that contravenes this 
Higher Law cannot be a law, and judicial review is a way to ensure that 
such laws cease to existP The doctrine of judicial review lies at the root 
of natural law theories, and it implies the right to disobey the unjust 
law, whatever sacrifice disobedience may entail. 18 Judicial review pro-
vides the means to restrain the arbitrary exercise of governmental 
power. 19 
The judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation requires at 
least three conditions for it to function in a given constitutional sys-
tem.20 First, it requires the existence of a written constitution which is 
conceived as a superior and fundamental law with clear supremacy over 
all other laws. 21 Second, the constitution must be of a rigid character; 
the amendments or reforms that may be introduced can only be put 
into practice by means of a particular process.22 Third, the constitution 
must establish the judicial means for guaranteeing the supremacy of 
the constitution over legislative acts. 23 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN GERMANY AND THE 
UNITED STATES: CENTRALIZED vs. DECENTRALIZED SYSTEMS 
Judicial review in a centralized system reflects a different conception 
of the separation of powers and is based upon a doctrine radically 
different from that upon which decentralized review is founded. 24 The 
centralized system of judicial review, favored by civil law countries,25 
confines the power to determine the constitutionality of legislation to 
15 See id. 
16 See CAPPELLETTI, supra note II, at II7. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. Americans, who first effectively implemented judicial review, were willing to admit the 
theoretical primacy of certain kinds of law and were ready to provide a judicial means for 
enforcing that primacy. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, jUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WoRLD 
25 (l97I). 
19 See id. at I. 
20 BREWER-CARIAS, supra note I 0, at l. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. Administrative judicial review occurs when the courts consider whether the actions of 
government agencies (other than the courts) are legally appropriate and proper or represent an 
abuse of discretion beyond what the law allows. Tate, supra note I, at 5. Relevant laws, including 
constitutions, may provide a definition of what is an appropriate exercise of bureaucratic discre-
tion. /d. This Note will not specifically address administrative judicial review. 
24CAPPELLETTI, supra note 11, at I37. 
25 The archetype of the centralized system of judicial review is found in the Austrian Constitu-
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a single judicial organ.26 The countries preferring this system ofjudicial 
review tend to adhere more rigidly to the doctrine of separation of 
powers and the supremacy of statutory law.27 Because many people feel 
that any judicial interpretation or invalidation of statutes is essentially 
a political act, it is sometimes viewed as an encroachment on the 
exclusive power of the legislative branch to make law.28 The centralized 
systems thus refuse to grant this power to the judiciary generally.29 
Rather, the ordinary judges must accept and apply the law as it is 
written.30 
On the other hand, the decentralized system of review, which had 
its origin in the United States, gives all the judicial organs within it the 
power to determine the constitutionality of legislation. 31 The rationale 
behind giving the entire judiciary the duty of constitutional control is, 
on its face, both logical and simple. 32 It is precisely the function of the 
judiciary to interpret the laws and apply them in concrete cases.33 A 
constitutional norm prevails over an ordinary legislative norm with 
which it conflicts.34 Any judge in a decentralized system, deciding a 
case where an applicable legislative norm conflicts with the constitu-
tion, must disregard the former and apply the latter. 35 
tion of 1920. See id. at 136. Other civil law countries, including Italy, Cyprus, Turkey, and 
Yugoslavia have adopted this system as well. See id. 
26 !d. at 133. Three principal reasons account for adoption of a centralized system of review in 
a growing number of civil law countries. Id. at 137. First, the conception in civil law countries of 
a rigid separation of powers between branches of government partially explains the centralized 
system of review. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 11, at 137. Second, the absence of a principle compa-
rable to stare decisis in civil law jurisprudence does not enable consistent decisions, and this 
explains the need for one constitutional court. See id. Third, the unsuitability of the civil law 
judiciary undoubtedly establishes the need for only one court to handle important constitutional 
questions. !d. The traditional highest courts of most civil law countries were found to lack the 
structure, procedures, and mentality required for effective constitutional adjudication. Id. at 
142-43. 
27 !d. at 137. 
28 See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 11, at 137. 
29 !d. 
30 See id. 
31 !d. at 132-33. The decentralized model remains a characteristic and unique institution in 
the United States. !d. at 133. It is found primarily in several of Britain's former colonies, including 
Canada, Australia, and India. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 11, at 133. 
32 !d. at 135. 
33 !d. 
34 !d. 
35 !d. 
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A. Germany: A Centralized System of judicial Review 
In Germany, the Constitutional Court has virtually comprehensive 
competence for all questions of constitutionallaw.36 When a party raises 
a constitutional objection to a statute involved in any civil, criminal, or 
administrative case, the court hearing the case will refer the question 
to the Constitutional Court (the Bundesverfassungsgericht) for deci-
sion if it thinks that the statute is unconstitutionaJ.37 When the decision 
of the Constitutional Court is issued, the original proceeding is re-
sumed.38 The Constitutional Court has a monopoly position in that it 
alone can declare statutes invalid.39 
Moreover, the Court's decisions are not merely binding upon all the 
litigants in the actual case, but in so far as they apply and interpret 
constitutional law, they generally bind all constitutional organs, courts, 
and authorities of Germany.40 The binding effect extends to the hold-
ing and its essential reasoning, but not to every single statement made 
by the Court in its often lengthy explanationsY The decisions of 
the Constitutional Court, however, are not binding on the Court it-
36 BLAIR, supra note 5, at 27. 
37 MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 92-93 (2d ed. 1994). The 
judge is not entitled to leave the statute which he regards as unconstitutional unconsidered in 
the course of the actual case. Dr. Jorn Ipsen, Constitutional Review of Laws, in MAIN PRINCIPLES 
OF THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 107, 112 (Christian Starck ed., 1983). According to Article 100(1) of 
the Grundgesetz, or the Basic Law, he is obliged to suspend the case and submit the question to 
the German Constitutional Court. See id. 
38 GLENDON, supra note 37, at 93. While the lower courts do not make the ultimate decisions 
regarding constitutionality, they do play an important role in the judicial process. See id. at 92-93. 
They determine whether a statute is unconstitutional, warranting review by the Constitutional 
Court. See id. If they do not think a statute is unconstitutional, then the issue will not go to the 
Constitutional Court for its decision. See id. 
39 Ipsen, supra note 37, at 112. It has a monopoly of constitutional jurisdiction because the 
other German courts lack the rights assumed by federal and state courts in the United States to 
invalidate, or at least refuse to apply, legislation on the grounds of unconstitutionality. BLAIR, 
supra note 5, at 27. Although German courts, in the course of adversary proceedings, have the 
unrestricted competence of accessory or incidental judicial review, they do not have authority to 
declare statutes invalid. Ipsen, supra note 37, at ll2. This procedure is commonly described in 
legal literature as the right of an individual judge to review but not repeal statutes. /d. 
40 BLAIR, supra note 5, at 27. In an early decision, for example, the Court held that the 
principles governing the allocation of air time by radio and television stations for political 
campaigns are binding on all stations-not merely those in the original lawsuit-and with respect 
to all political parties. Wolfgang Zeidler, The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of 
Germany: Decisions on the Constitutionality of Legal Norms, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 504, 520 
(1987). Once the Court declares a norm unconstitutional, the legislature is prevented from 
repromulgating the same provision. !d. 
41 !d. 
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self.42 The Court has explicitly declared that it is permitted to dismiss 
legal opinions stated in earlier decisions, regardless of its importance 
to the earlier decision.43 
Four well-known constitutional principles which partially comprise 
the "Rule of Law" lend explanation for judicial review in Germany. 44 
First, the separation of powers is explicitly maintained in the German 
Constitution, and it is implicitly maintained in the provisions that 
govern judicial competency. 45 Second, the independence of the courts 
and judges is stipulated by the German Constitution which states that 
"the judges shall be independent and subject only to the law."46 Third, 
the binding force of statutory law upon judges and executive officers 
is primarily an interpretive, not a political or institutional, problemY 
Whenever the meaning of a statutory rule is clear and precise, the 
judge will feel bound by it and will accordingly give deference to the 
statute.48 Problems arise in those areas of the law where the meaning 
of the rule is not clear and precise.49 Fourth, the large and compre-
hensive jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court allows for 
judicial review.50 Although the Constitutional Court has no appellate 
jurisdiction, when a conflict exists between state and federal law and 
when the Federal Constitution is at stake, the Court has jurisdiction. 51 
Such jurisdiction necessarily allows for judicial review because it allows 
42 /d. at 521. 
43 !d. Realistically, however, the Court departs from its own precedent only with great reluc-
tance. Zeidler, supra note 40, at 521. Because of its unique ability to establish binding interpre-
tations of the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court, as the highest court, must be author-
ized to correct legal opinions which are later found to be inappropriate, excessively far-reaching, 
or based on false precepts. !d. In accord with this authority, the Court recently corrected fixed 
guidelines for building development plans which were too general. !d. (citing 70 BVerfGE 35, 
53). After a detailed analysis of the res judicata effect in each individual case, the Court arrived 
at a more differentiating solution, stating it would no longer adhere to the earlier case law. ld. 
44 Erhard Denninger, judicial Review Revisited: The German Experience, 59 TuL. L. REv. 1013, 
1015 (1985). 
45 See id. 
46 /d. (citing GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG) art. 97, para. 1). Paragraph 3 of Article 1 of 
the Basic Law provides that fundamental rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the 
judiciary as "directly enforceable law." GG art. 1, para. 3. Furthermore, Article 20, paragraph 3 
of the Basic Law states that the executive and the judiciary shall be bound by "Gesetz and Recht," 
which means "law and justice." /d. art. 20, para. 3. 
47 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1015-16. 
48 !d. at 1016. 
49 /d. 
50 /d. Such comprehensive jurisdiction includes, among other powers, the right to conduct 
abstract judicial review, concrete judicial review, and rule on legislative omissions. See Zeidler, 
supra note 40, at 505-07. 
01 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1016. 
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the Court to strike down laws inconsistent with the Federal Constitu-
tion.52 
1. Means the Constitutional Court Employs to Determine 
Constitutionality 
In Germany, the Court uses "constitutional textualism" to interpret 
the Constitution. 53 According to this method, the Court strictly adheres 
to the constitutional text.54 However, the Court also utilizes systematic 
and teleological modes of inquiry. 55 The focus is on the text as a whole, 
and the judges ascertain the theme, or telos, of the Constitution. 56 In 
order to confirm judgments based on teleological reasoning, the Court 
employs historical and functional considerations.57 
The Court has invoked theories of its own creation, including the 
notion of the "objective order of values. "58 According to this concept, 
the Constitution incorporates the "basic value decisions" of the found-
ing fathers, the most basic of which is their choice of a free democratic 
basic order, including a liberal, representative, federal, parliamentary 
democracy, buttressed and reinforced by basic rights and liberties.59 
These basic values are objective because they have an independent 
reality under the Constitution, imposing upon all organs of govern-
ment an affirmative duty to see that they are realized in practice.60 The 
Constitutional Court incorporates this concept by interpreting the 
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) in terms of its overall structural unity and by 
envisioning the Basic Law as a unified structure of substantive values.61 
In one case, for example, the Constitutional Court held that a provi-
sion in the tax laws which afforded unwed mothers and foster parents 
certain benefits was constitutionally conforming.62 The Court con-
cluded that fathers of illegitimate children-who are not specifically 
52 See id. 
53 See Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY LJ. 837, 844 
(1991). 
54 See id. 
55 !d. 
56 !d. The Basic Law must not only be understood as the sum total of individual guarantees and 
organizational regulations, but also as a unity which is characterized by certain value judgments, 
especially those concerning basic human rights and the principles of constitutionality and de-
mocracy. Zeidler, supra note 40, at 507. 
57 See Kommers, supra note 53, at 844-45. 
58 See id. at 858. 
59 Id. at 858-59. 
60 !d. at 859. 
61 See id. at 858. 
62 See Zeidler, supra note 40, at 510. 
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covered by the wording of the law-could in certain circumstances be 
considered "foster parents" in view of the constitutional requirement 
of equality for illegitimate children.63 The Court premised its decision 
on the assumption that the legislature would have included such a 
definition if it had recognized the omission.64 
In addition to postulating an objective order of values, the Justices 
of the Federal Constitutional Court have also arranged these values in 
a hierarchical order crowned by the principle of human dignity.65 It 
was precisely this principle of human dignity that compelled the Court 
to strike down a liberalized abortion statute in 1975.66 In its opinion, 
the Court stated: "That interruptions of pregnancy are neither legally 
condemned nor subject to punishment is not compatible with the duty 
incumbent upon the legislature to protect life, if the interruptions are 
a result of reasons which are not recognized in the value order of the 
Basic Law. "67 
2. Criticisms and Defenses of Judicial Review as Exercised by the 
Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court is often criticized for its political role.68 
Many government agencies and party leaders resort to constitutional 
litigation for essentially political ends.69 When the Court appears to 
cooperate in the achievement of these ends, it is sometimes rebuked 
by German citizens.70 Also, the Court invites objections when it creates 
value theories, thus imposing its own values on the nation as a whole.71 
For example, in 1993, the Court again asserted an unlimited duty of 
the state to protect nascent life following the enaction of The Preg-
nancy and Family Assistance Law of July 27, 1992.72 Therefore, unless 
63 !d. 
64 !d. 
65 Kommers, supra note 53, at 860. 
66 !d. 
67 Abortion Case, 39 BVerfGE 1, 1-2 (1975). 
68 See Kommers, supra note 53, at 843. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. Criticism is usually directed against the government agencies or party leaders who 
would resort to constitutional litigation for essentially political ends. !d. 
71 See id. 
72 GLENDON, supra note 37, at 116; Rainer Frank, Federal Republic of Germany: Three Decisions 
of the Federal Constitutional Court, 33]. FAM. L. 353, 355-56 (1994-95). The Pregnancy and Family 
Assistance Law maintained that a termination of pregnancy within the first twelve weeks was to 
remain non punishable if the pregnant women consulted a recognized office before the abortion. 
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one of the exceptions already listed in the law is not present, a termi-
nation of pregnancy is fundamentally an unlawful act. 73 
The difficult problems of judicial review in Germany cannot be 
resolved by mere resort to statutory or constitutional interpretation 
because they are caused by functional and political realities. 74 The 
German Constitution's supremacy clause entirely disregards all ques-
tions of federal or state competence or jurisdiction. 7·5 "Supremacy" in 
the German Constitution means the abstract ranking of rules. 76 Con-
stitutional rules override all other kinds of rules, including parliamen-
tary statutory law, executive orders, regulations and administrative 
rulings having the force of law, bylaws of corporations and municipali-
ties, and common law. 77 The relationship between federal and state law 
is briefly covered by a rule within the German Constitution which 
maintains that federal law shall override state law.78 
B. The United States of America: A Decentralized 
System of Judicial Review 
The United States has a decentralized system of judicial review which 
gives all judicial organs within it the power to determine the constitu-
GLENDON, supra note 37, at ll6; Frank, supra at 355-56. Essentially, the law had the motto 
"assistance instead of punishment." GLENDON, supra note 37, at 116; Frank, supra at 355-56. In 
1993, the Constitutional Court held the 1992 statute partially unconstitutional. GLENDON, supra 
note 37, at ll6; Frank, supra at 355-56. Reaffirming its 1975 decision, the Court held that the 
state has an affirmative duty to protect life. GLENDON, supra note 37, at ll6; Frank, supra at 
355-56. Except for cases involving severe hardships, including rape, incest, or health reasons, the 
Court held that abortion must remain unlawful. GLENDON, supra note 37, at ll6; Frank, supra at 
355-56. According to the Court, the state's duty also includes keeping the public aware of the 
unlawfulness of abortion. GLENDON, supra note 37, at 116; Frank, supra at 355-56. 
73 Frank, supra note 72, at 356. 
74 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1016. These problems are brought about by the third and fourth 
elements of the Rule of Law. !d. 
75 !d. The Supremacy Clause asserts that the Basic Law controls the entire German legal order. 
Kommers, supra note 53, at 846. Article 1, paragraph 3, declares that the fundamental rights 
listed in the Basic Law, including the inviolable principle of human dignity, "shall bind the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly enforceable law." !d. Article 20 reinforces 
this provision by subjecting the legislature to the constitutional order and by binding the execu-
tive and judiciary to law and justice. !d. Article 19, paragraph 2 carries the principle of the Basic 
Law's supremacy even further; it bans any law or governmental action that invades "the essential 
content of [any] basic right." !d. Moreover, Article 79, paragraph 3-known as the "eternity 
clause "-bars any amendment to the Basic Law that would tamper with the principle of federalism 
or impinge on the state an affirmative duty to respect and protect it. !d. 
76 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1016. 
77 !d. 
78 !d. In German, this rule is translated as: "Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht." !d. 
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tionality oflegislation.79 Any judge deciding a case where an applicable 
legislative norm conflicts with the Constitution must disregard the 
former and apply the latter.80 This would certainly lead to inconsistent 
results on close questions because of differing modes of interpretation, 
but the doctrine of stare decisis resolves this.81 According to this doc-
trine, courts are bound to follow their own prior decisions and the 
precedents of higher courts in the same jurisdiction.82 The existence 
of the single Supreme Court, combined with the lower courts' duty to 
follow superior precedents, ensures the uniformity of constitutional 
adjudication. 83 
1. Means By Which the Supreme Court Applies Judicial Review 
There are several different ways in which the Supreme Court reviews 
the constitutionality of statutes.84 Textualism is one constitutional 
methodology used by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. 85 
However, a major problem with textualism is that the text may not be 
clear.86 A second method used by the Supreme Court for constitutional 
interpretation is "originalism."87 This is the view that the Court should 
strike down legislation only if it violates the original intent of the 
Framers of the Constitution.88 For the open-textured provisions and for 
modern problems not specifically targeted by the text, originalism 
offers some concrete guidance and constraint.89 A third method em-
79 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 11, at 132-33. This differs from the centralized system which 
confines the power to a single, judicial organ. !d. at 133. 
80 !d. at 135. Generally, a constitutional norm, if the constitution is rigid, prevails over an 
ordinary legislative norm in conflict with it. !d. 
81 !d. at 138. 
82 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 11, at 139. 
83 !d. 
84 See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 77 (1993). 
85 See id.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). This case was the first 
Supreme Court opinion to assert the power of judicial review. See infra notes 158-73. 
86 See FARBER, supra note 84, at 77. 
87 !d. at 78. 
88 !d. Interpretation, therefore, depends on history. JoHN ARTHUR, WoRDS THAT BIND 23 
( 1995). The question to be asked in interpreting vague constitutional language is how those who 
originally wrote the words understood them; the limits imposed on elected officials by the 
Constitution are exactly the limits that the Framers had in mind to impose. !d. 
89 FARBER, supra note 84, at 78. However, originalism has its own problems. !d. at 79. First, the 
Framers of most of the provisions of the Constitution failed to discuss the issues in which we are 
interested today. !d. Also, even when the Framers addressed specific issues in clear terms, there 
remains the problem of aggregating individual views into the collective views of a diverse group 
of individuals. !d. These practical problems with originalism make it practically impossible to 
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ployed by the Court to determine the scope of a provision is to refer 
to tradition and the Court's own precedents.90 Under this approach, 
constitutional interpretation operates as a form of common law, devel-
oping over time but constrained by the past.91 
A fourth method, advocated by Professor John Hart Ely, is the rep-
resentation-reinforcing approach to judicial review.92 Essentially, Ely 
argues that certain provisions of the Constitution are too elastic to 
constrain the Supreme Court and are open-textured as to invite dy-
namic interpretation over time.93 To provide meaning to these clauses, 
Ely concludes that judges should supply answers that derive from the 
general themes of the entire constitutional document and not from a 
source beyond the Constitution.94 
A fifth approach to constitutional interpretation is a normative ap-
proach.95 Normativists argue that the indeterminacy oflaw is liberating 
rather than debilitating, because it frees judges to consider arguments 
of justice and norms.96 It also requires judges to take responsibility for 
their actions, and to approach their task in a more humble manner.97 
Under this mode of interpretation, the Supreme Court, when inter-
preting the Constitution, is speaking to a current audience, seeking to 
persuade them that their vision is morally justifiable.98 
figure out the specific intentions of the Framers about any current constitutional issue. !d. A 
deeper problem with originalism is that the Framers may have realized the futility of writing many 
specific answers in the Constitution. FARBER, supra note 84, at 79. Perhaps their specific intention 
was to provide no concrete answers, but to let the answers develop over time in a common law 
fashion. !d. 
90 See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 41 (2d ed. 1991). 
91 !d. 
92 FARBER, supra note 84, at 100. 
93 !d. 
94 !d. In this way, dynamic judicial review would be consistent with the consent of the governed. 
!d. The generation of the Framers gave future judges expansive language, but those judges would 
be constrained by the themes of the overall Constitution. !d.; see also infra notes 99-123 and 
accompanying text (addressing the countermajoritarian difficulty). 
95 See FARBER, supra note 84, at 114. 
96 !d. An open-ended constitutional provision might be given content by referring to prevailing 
morality or to some form of consensus. STONE, supra note 90, at 41. But this possibility raises two 
questions. !d. First, it is hardly clear that judges are better than legislators as registers of social 
consensus. !d. Second, in light of the fact that the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, is 
often regarded as a shield against social consensus, it might be inconsistent to suggest that its 
content derives from that consensus. Id. at 41-42. 
9? See FARBER, supra note 84, at 114. 
98 !d. 
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2. Criticisms and Defenses ofjudicial Review in the United States 
Most objections to American judicial review are based on its coun-
termajoritarian nature.99 The countermajoritarian difficulty arises be-
cause the power of judicial review is in tension with our fundamental 
commitment to representative democracy. 10° For many, it is troubling 
that nine unelected judges with life tenure have the power of judicial 
review. 101 Legislation has legitimate coercive force; it has been adopted 
by majority votes of representatives elected by the people. 102 These 
representatives are accountable to the people because of their limited 
terms. 103 The coercive force of decisions invalidating legislated statutes, 
when made by unelected judges who cannot be removed from office, 
however, requires more elaborate justification-this is the counterma-
joritarian difficulty.I 04 
There are many defenses to the countermajoritarian argument. 105 
First, the countermajoritarian difficulty seems irrelevant when the leg-
islature itself authorizes review. 106 Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, which is itself a legislative act, gives the Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion to review a final judgment in the highest court in which it deter-
mines the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States. 107 
Second, the most typical defense against the countermajoritarian 
difficulty attempts to illustrate that judicial review is consistent with 
popular consent.108 There are four elements to this approach. 109 The 
first step is to conceptualize the Constitution as a consent-based docu-
ment.110 It was ratified through state conventions, and subsequent 
generations of Americans have been born into this arrangement and 
implicitly consent by taking advantage of the opportunities offered by 
our polity and by retaining their citizenship. 111 The second step is to 
conceptualize the Constitution as not just any majoritarian document, 
99 See id. at 7 4. 
100 See id. at 75. 
101 /d. at 74. 
102 See FARBER, supra note 84, at 97. 
103 /d. 
104 See id. at 97. 
105 See id. at 75. 
106 /d. at 74. 
107 FARBER, supra note 84, at 74. 
108 /d. at 75. 
lOY Jd. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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but one of supervening authority. 112 The Supremacy Clause states that 
the Constitution "trumps" federal and state laws inconsistent with it. 113 
Thus, any current expression of majority preferences, through legisla-
tion and elected representatives, is subject to the ongoing limits ex-
pressed in the Constitution. 114 The third step is to demonstrate that, in 
a given case, the federal or state law is actually inconsistent with the 
Constitution. 115 The fourth step is to conclude that the Supreme Court 
has the authority to strike down a federal or state law that is inconsis-
tent with the Constitution. 116 
Under this approach, the Supreme Court is merely imposing the 
limits set by the original supermcyority upon the current preferences 
of perhaps a temporary majority. 117 Thus, the Court is only enforcing 
the original Constitution, and its action is neither countermajoritarian 
nor violative of the consent of the governed. 118 If Congress or a state 
legislature enacts a statute which is directly inconsistent with the text 
of a provision of the Constitution, then the Court is on its strongest 
ground in overriding current mcyorities. 119 
Another defense of the countermajoritarian difficulty is that it seems 
necessary as a way to protect minorities from a potentially tyrannical 
majority. 120 The role of the Court is to protect certain rights indispen-
sable to politics and certain groups that are for one reason or another 
112 FARBER, supra note 84, at 75. 
113 /d. 
114 /d. 
115 /d. 
116 /d. 
117FARBER, supra note 84, at 75. 
11H /d. There are many difficulties with such a formalist, consent-based theory ofjudicial review. 
/d. at 76. It may not be appropriate for the major premise to assume that we have an ongoing 
implicit consent to the original Constitution, which was negotiated and ratified by only a tiny 
minority of the population who could not possibly have envisioned what the world would be like. 
See id. Also, there is a central problem with constitutional indeterminacy. /d. After all, you could 
read the constitutional provision in question to be consistent with the statute. FARBER, supra note 
84, at 76. The problem is particularly large for consent-based theories, for if they are unable to 
avoid indeterminacy in constitutional interpretation-and they cannot provide "objective" an-
swers-they are unable to provide the interpretive closure necessary to escape the counterma-
joritarian difficulty. /d. 
119 /d. at 77. Textualism is the methodology deployed by Chiefjustice Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). /d. Chiefjustice Marshall contended that the mandamus 
provision was inconsistent with Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. /d. The 
constitutional provisions providing details for the structure are generally much easier to apply 
than the broader provisions defining limits on governmental action, such as the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Due Process Clause. FARBER, supra note 84, at 77-78. 
120 See STONE, supra note 90, at 43. 
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excluded from or unable fully to participate in politics. 121 The relative 
inability of such groups to participate in or be represented by the 
political process is said to justifY a judicial role designed to bring about 
a better democracy. 122 The Court, which is not directly accountable to 
the public, can better withstand the pressures of the majority than the 
legislature, and this will actually promote the democratic order. 123 
III. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
A. The History of German judicial Review and the Federal 
Constitutional Court 
The German Constitution of 1949 (Basic Law) was drafted in the 
aftermath of the nation's shocking experience with a totalitarian re-
gime.124 After the demise of the Third Reich, many Germans became 
aware of the fact that it was the "Staat," the government and all its staff, 
that had committed the most atrocious crimes.125 They realized that 
their legal order from 1933-1945, instead of fostering justice, had 
permitted brutal inhumanity and immorality.126 As a result, legal posi-
tivism did not influence governmental action for many years. 127 Despite 
skepticism towards any kind of legislation, there was at the time an 
intense demand for legal rules and for establishing positions of justice, 
along with a strong tendency toward the promotion of judicial review. 128 
121 !d. 
122 !d. 
m See id. 
124 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1013. Germany's written constitution, known as the Basic Law, 
was so labeled because it was conceived as a transitional document pending national unification. 
Kommers, supra note 53, at 837. The more dignified term (Verfassung) would be reserved for a 
governing document applicable to the nation as a whole and designed to last in perpetuity. !d. 
Over the years, the Basic Law, having survived the test of time, has taken on the character of a 
genuine constitution. !d. In fact, following the bloodless coup of March 18, 1990--the day on 
which East Germans voted to end Germany's division-a new and freely elected East German 
government chose to accede to the Federal Republic of Germany within the framework of the 
Basic Law. !d. This decision and the Unification Treaty signed later by East and West Germany 
transposed the Basic Law from a temporary instrument of governance for one part of Germany 
into a document of force and permanence for the entire German nation. !d. 
125 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1013. 
126 !d. 
127 !d. 
128 !d. The Basic Law marks a radical break with Germany's past. Kommers, supra note 53, at 
846. Previous constitutions in the democratic tradition were easily amended and not regarded as 
binding in all respects. !d. at 845-46. By contrast, the Basic Law is a binding document. !d. at 
846. 
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The judiciary's power increased as a result of these social changes and 
the average citizen's rising expectation that the administration operate 
as a modern democratic welfare state. 129 
Judicial power is deeply rooted in Germany's Basic Law-in the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. 130 It is not the con-
stitutional commitment to a social welfare state that strengthens the 
judicial branch at the expense of the legislative branch, but rather 
several principles which constitute the "Rule of Law. "131 
From 1949-1968, the Basic Law provided a federal supreme court 
in order to preserve the uniformity of the federallaw. 132 In 1968, several 
provisions of this law were amended. 133 The federal supreme court was 
abolished not because there was a fear of too powerful a judiciary, but 
because the envisaged integrating function of a federal supreme court 
was unnecessary. 134 This function has always been exercised by the 
Constitutional Court. 135 The Act on the Federal Constitutional Court 
of February 3, 1971 expressly acknowledged the Constitutional Court's 
dual function as a court of justice and a "warden of the constitution. "136 
The political character of the Constitutional Court is logically im-
plied by its preoccupation with constitutional law. 137 The political na-
ture of a constitutional court is, in essence, the subjection oflegislature 
and executive to the judgment of a court, and the attendant rejection 
of the unrestricted rule of the majority limited only by its self-re-
straint.138 The new readiness in post-war Germany to accept such sub-
jection of the political branches to the judicial branch is not surpris-
ing.139 Many Germans claim that the respect enjoyed by the 
Constitutional Court is a corollary of the distrust of the legislature, and 
they no longer believe that the political interests of the current major-
ity are set aside when the Constitution requires. 140 
129 See Denninger, supra note 44, at 1014. 
130 Id. at 1014-15. 
131 Id. at 1015. This is also known as "Rechtsstaatprinzip." Id. 
132 !d. at 1025. 
133 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1025. 
134 See id. 
135 Id. At present, five high courts of the five branches of jurisdiction are ranked as highest 
courts. Id. Some of their members have been designated to constitute a joint panel in order to 
preserve uniformity of the law. !d. 
136 Act on the Federal Constitutional Court, art. 1, 1971 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI], Teil I 297 
(F.R.G.). 
137 BLAIR, supra note 5, at 25. 
13H Id. 
139 Id. at 25-26. 
140 Id. at 26. 
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During the 1970s, the Constitutional Court frequently acted as a 
brake on the progressive or reform-minded activities of the liberal-so-
cial democratic majority in Parliament.141 The Constitutional Court was 
rebuked severely and repeatedly for offending the doctrine of the 
separation of powers. 142 Apart from politically-motivated criticisms, nu-
merous competent voices, including former judges and justices then 
in office, charged that the Constitutional Court had impermissibly 
intruded into the political sphere.143 These critics warned their col-
leagues that the Constitutional Court could abuse its powers by making 
political choices between competing legislative programs because basic 
rights are not solely subjective, but they also include objective deci-
sions.144 The critics believed that the concept of objective value deci-
sion-making should not become a vehicle for shifting essentially legis-
lative functions regarding the formation of the social order to the 
Constitutional Court.145 But despite the substantial opposition to its 
functioning in the political system, it is significant that the Constitu-
tional Court has not been hampered in its activities. 146 
B. The History of United States judicial Review and the 
Role of the Supreme Court 
To understand judicial review in the United States, one must under-
stand that in 1787, there was widespread fear of oppression by a remote 
federal government, centered largely in dread of "legislative despot-
ism. "147 Mter the Articles of Confederation, 148 however, some believed 
141 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1023. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144Jd. 
145 Id. at 1023-24 (citing the 1975 Abortion Case, 39 BVerfGE 1, and the University Reform 
Case, 35 BVerfGE 79). In the dissenting opinion of the Abortion Case, one justice remarked that 
"the Federal Constitutional Court is unwarily falling in this case into the position of a political 
arbitration board to be used for the choice between competing legislative projects." GLENDON, 
supra note 37, at llO. 
146 BLAIR, supra note 5, at 26. 
147 RAouL BERGER, CoNGRESS v. THE SuPREME CouRT 8 (1969). Americans, after gaining their 
independence from Britain, did not want to make the same mistakes in their government that 
they believed Britain had made. ld. 
148 The Articles of Confederation were adopted shortly after the Revolution in order to ensure 
some unification of the states for common foreign and domestic problems, but the overriding 
understanding was that the states would remain sovereign. STONE, supra note 90, at 2. By modern 
standards, however, there were conspicuous gaps. Id. The power to tax and the power to regulate 
commerce were missing. Id. Also, two of the three branches of the national government-the 
executive and the judicial branches--were nonexistent. ld. 
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that only despotism could effectively govern the vast land mass.149 
When work of the Constitutional Convention was finally completed 
and the proposed Constitution published, it produced widespread 
controversy. 150 Answers to many governmental questions and political 
concerns could not be found within the Constitution itself because it 
did little to specify the powers it conferred or the relationships among 
the branches it created.l51 It is this vagueness, however, that allowed for 
the establishment of judicial review. 152 
The judiciary, established in Article III of the Constitution, is the 
least well-defined of the three branches of government.153 Article III 
speaks of judicial power that is vested in a Supreme Court and of the 
power of the Court to hear cases arising under the Constitution of the 
United States.154 The nature and limits of judicial power are not deline-
ated, nor is it explained which cases arise under the Constitution.155 
Indeed, the Constitution neither explicitly gives the federal courts 
authority to overturn statutes passed by Congress and state legislatures 
nor asserts that judicial review is not among the Court's functions. 156 
Yet despite the lack of a clear mandate for judicial review, the Supreme 
Court has exercised that power and left a clear mark on American 
history. 157 
1. Marbury v. Madison-The First Sign of Judicial Review 
The 1803 decision of Marbury v. Madison158 was the first Supreme 
Court opinion explicitly asserting the power of judicial review, or the 
149 BERGER, supra note 147, at 8--9. In Federalist No. 10, Madison wrote that "among the 
numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately 
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction." THE FEDERALIST No. 
10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
150 ARTHUR, supra note 88, at 8. 
151Jd. 
152 See id. "[l]t is clear as such matters can be that the Framers of the Constitution specifically, 
if tacitly, expected that the federal courts would assume a power--of whatever exact dimensions-
to pass on the constitutionality of actions of the Congress and the President, as well as of the 
several states." ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15 (1962). 
153 ARTHUR, supra note 88, at 8. 
154Jd. 
155 Jd. 
156 Jd. 
157 Jd.; see also Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, No. 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
15BThe plaintiff, William Marbury, brought suit in the Supreme Court without first bringing 
suit in a lower court. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 153-58. He asked the Court to determine 
that Secretary of State James Madison had unlawfully refused to deliver Marbury's commission, 
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power to strike down federal statutes that violate the Constitution.159 
According to Chief Justice Marshall, Article III of the Constitution gives 
the Court the power to exercise original jurisdiction in cases affecting 
ambassadors and other consuls or where a state is a party. 160 Otherwise, 
the Supreme Court is to exercise appellate jurisdiction.161 In the last 
part of his opinion, Marshall considers why the Court, rather than 
another branch of government, should have the power to pass on the 
constitutionality of enactments, and he provides several justifications 
for judicial review. 162 First, he asserts that the Constitution controls any 
legislative act repugnant to it, and the fact that the constitution is 
written requires judicial review. 163 He states, "The distinction between 
a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those 
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if 
acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation."164 
Second, Marshall maintains that because judges take an oath to 
uphold the Constitution, they should be given the power of judicial 
review. 165 Although all government officials take such an oath, Marshall 
claims that this oath applies in a special manner to the conduct of 
judges in their official capacity. 166 A judge cannot swear to discharge 
his duties properly to the Constitution of the United States if the 
Constitution forms no rule for the judiciary and if the Constitution 
cannot be interpreted by the judiciary.167 
Third, Marshall bases his argument on Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution, and he concludes, "It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."168 According to 
establishing him as a District of Columbia justice of the Peace. Id. at 153. Marbury sought a writ 
of mandamus, compelling the Court to order Madison to deliver the commission. I d. Chief Justice 
Marshall delivered his first important opinion which added a permanent fixture to our constitu-
tional system-judicial review. FARBER, supra note 84, at 8. 
159 Id. The Marshall Court held, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 304 
(1816), that the Supreme Court also had the power to review state court statutes to determine 
whether the state statutes violated federal law. FARBER, supra note 84, at 8. This Note, however, 
will concentrate mostly on the judicial review of federal statutes in the United States, and it will 
not discuss issues of federalism. 
I60 See Marlntry, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173. 
161 See id. at 173-75. 
l62 See generally id. at 175-80. 
16~ See id. at 176. 
164 !d. at 176--77. 
165 See Marlntry, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. at 177. 
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Marshall, Article III extends the judicial power of the United States to 
all cases arising under the Constitution. 169 Marshall argues that this 
grant of jurisdiction would be meaningless if the courts did not have 
authority to examine the constitutionality of Congressional acts.l1° 
Fourth, Marshall focuses on notions of judicial roles, asserting that 
it is the ordinary role of courts to interpret the law. 171 That role, 
Marshall claims, requires judges to construe the Constitution in the 
ordinary course of conducting business. 172 Finally, Marshall contends 
that the Supremacy Clause lends credence to the existence of judicial 
review. 173 Laws shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, and an 
act repugnant to the Constitution must not be given effect.174 
2. Judicial Review Mter Marbury 
The Supreme Court's responsibility to undertake decisions in cases 
satisfYing the proper jurisdictional requirements has changed dramati-
cally since John Marshall was Chief Justice. 175 The Judiciary Act of 1925, 
which still remains in effect, placed the question of judicial review 
almost entirely within the discretion of the Supreme Court. 176 With the 
Judiciary Act, almost all cases become reviewable only by the discre-
tionary writ of certiorari. 177 The Court retains some formally obligatory 
jurisdiction, but even this small portion of its work has taken on 
169 See id. 
170 See Marlmry, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
171 See id. at 177-78. 
172 See id. at 177-79. 
173 /d. The Supremacy Clause provides that the "Constitution and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CaNST. 
art. VI, cl. 2. 
174 STONE, supra note 90, at 32. It is clear, however, that the supremacy clause itself cannot be 
the clear textual basis for a claim by the judiciary that the right to determine the repugnancy of 
a law belongs to it. /d. 
175 DORIS M. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CouRT 1 (1980). 
176 /d. 
177 /d. at 1. In the U.S. Supreme Court, a review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, 
but of judicial discretion, and it will only be granted when there are special and important reasons. 
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1609 (6th ed. 1990). The Court's single published guide to its criteria 
in case selection is Rule I 9 of the Supreme Court Rules. PROVINE, supra note 175, at 3. This rule 
only cites the character of reasons which will be considered in the review decision. /d. The 
principal grounds for review that are mentioned in Rule 19 are conflicts among lower federal 
courts and important federal questions. /d. The Court has not released any official commentary 
on this vague rule, and justices have not given it precise meaning in any decisions. /d. Conse-
quently, when the Court refuses to hear a case, the only certainty is that the case did not receive 
the four affirmative votes necessary for review. /d. 
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discretionary characteristics as its caseload has grown increasingly bur-
densome.178 The typical issue the Court now faces is not whether the 
Court has jurisdiction to decide, but whether it will choose to decide 
a case on the merits. 179 
The decision to decide has become more crucial because the Court's 
capacity to hear and resolve cases has not kept pace with the increasing 
volume of petitions. 180 While the Court claims that case selection is not 
a decision on the merits, the denial of review is the end of the road 
for most petitioners. 181 Therefore, the case-selection process has im-
mense practical importance for litigants. 182 
The acceptance of judicial review was tested by the Court's decision 
in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 183 Until that decision, the Court had over-
turned only one federal statute, the minor law involved in Marbury v. 
Madison. 184 In Dred Scott, however, Chief Justice Roger Taney held for 
the Court that Congress had exceeded its constitutional powers in 
adopting the Missouri Compromise prohibiting slavery in some terri-
tories.185 That decision was intended to resolve the legal controversy 
over slavery.186 Instead, the level of controversy increased and the Court 
was criticized in the North. 187 Yet, although the Court's prestige suf-
fered dramatically, the Court itself and its basic powers survived with-
out serious challenge.188 This survival demonstrated the success of the 
assertion of power that Marshall had undertaken. 189 Whatever the legal 
and philosophical merits of Marshall's Marbury opinion and those 
opinions subsequent to it, judicial review of Congress is no longer 
seriously questioned. 190 Relying on judicial review, courts have gone on 
to strike down a vast array of laws as unconstitutional. 191 
178 PROVINE, supra note 175, at 1. 
179 /d. 
180 /d. The Court currently turns down more than ninety percent of the petitions that fulfill 
jurisdictional requirements. /d. 
181 /d. 
182 PROVINE, supra note 175, at 1. 
183 LAwRENCE BAUM, THE SuPREME CouRT 19 (2d ed. 1985); see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. (How. 19) 393 (1857). 
184 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (How. 19) at 393-400. 
185 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (How. 19) at 393-400; BAUM, supra note 183, at 19. 
186 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (How. 19) at 393-400; BAUM, supra note 183, at 19. 
187 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (How. 19) at 393-400; BAUM, supra note 183, at 19. 
188 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (How. 19) at 393-400; BAUM, supra note 183, at 19. 
189 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (How. 19) at 393-400; BAUM, supra note 183, at 19. 
190 See ARTHUR, supra note 88, at 16. 
191 /d.; see generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (providing the major judicial support 
for the view that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is supreme and 
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IV. THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
A. The German Constitutional Court 
143 
The Constitutional Court is a specialized constitutional tribunal;192 
it is the "supreme guardian of the Constitution. "193 It is autonomous 
with respect to all other supreme constitutional bodies, and it is an 
independent court of the federation. 194 The Court's role is to decide 
constitutional issues, not to avoid them or to resolve them as a matter 
of last resort.195 
1. The Structure of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court has two chambers, or senates, each com-
posed of eight judges.196 The senates are independent of one another; 
each acts as the Constitutional Court.197 There is no appeal to the 
plenum by the litigants, but if one senate, in deciding a legal question, 
disagrees with the opinion of the other senate, the question has to be 
referred to the plenum of the Court. 198 In spite of the character of the 
final); Brown v. Board ofEduc. of Topeka, No.1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring segregation in 
the school systems of Topeka, Kansas and other schools to violate the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (striking down a New York monopoly law and 
upholding the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce as enumerated in the Consti-
tution); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (holding that the Judiciary Act 
authorized, and the Constitution permitted, Supreme Court review of state court decisions in 
criminal cases where federal issues were properly presented). 
192 Kommers, supra note 53, at 840. 
193 /d. The preservation of the constitutional state in all of its particulars is the function of the 
Federal Constitutional Court. /d. at 848. 
194Denninger, supra note 44, at 1025. 
195 Kommers, supra note 53, at 848. 
196GLENDON, supra note 37, at 93. 
197 /d. Each Senate has its own separate jurisdiction and is administratively separate from the 
other. Alan N. Katz, Federal Republic of Germany, in LEGAL TRADITIONS AND SYSTEMS-AN INTER-
NATIONAL HANDBOOK 85,90 (Alan N. Katz ed., 1986). There is a clear demarcation of responsi-
bilities between the two Senates. BLAIR, supra note 5, at 11. The first Senate retains jurisdiction 
in cases of concrete judicial review or constitutional complaints. /d. Thus, it deals with the basic 
liberties located in Articles 1-20 of the Basic Law. Katz, supra, at 90. The second Senate is 
responsible for deciding the m~ority of significant federal cases. BLAIR, supra note 5, at 12. It is 
charged with handling conflicts between the various levels of government, as well as election 
disputes, disagreements involving international law, and questions related to the constitutionality 
of political parties. Katz, supra, at 90. 
198 GLENDON, supra note 37, at 93. 
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Constitutional Court as a "twin court," the uniformity of constitutional 
law can be maintained.199 
The justices of the Constitutional Court regard themselves as "the 
guardians of the Constitution. "200 The Parliament elects the justices by 
a two-thirds vote for a single, non-renewable term of twelve years.201 An 
effort is made to ensure that the Court's membership reflects all major 
political groupings.202 But there is little sign that Constitutional Court 
judges are chosen with an eye toward their views on federalism.203 The 
Court retains a relatively collegial and anonymous character, and the 
views on federalism of most of the judges cannot be specified with 
certainty.204 The evidence of the values and the influences of individual 
judges is incomplete, and conclusions based on such an inquiry have 
little value.205 
The Constitutional Court judges differ from ordinary German 
judges in several important respects.206 First, while the judge of an 
ordinary state or federal court resorts primarily to interpretation of 
simple statutes in reaching decisions, a justice of the Constitutional 
Court uses the text of the Constitution as his yardstick.207 Second, the 
judge is bound to observe rules regularly enacted, but the Constitu-
tional Court justice may declare legislation null and void.208 Third, 
some of the Constitutional Court's decisions pass into law, and its 
holdings are published in the Federal Gazette.209 As a consequence, the 
Court's decisions bind all federal and state organs of government and 
all other German courts and public officials. 210 The decisions of the 
Constitutional Court, however, are not binding on the Court itself.211 
199 !d. 
2oo Denninger, supra note 44, at 1017. 
201 Kommers, supra note 53, at 844. This regulation exists because there was an awareness of 
the risk of an inhibited judicial behavior toward those with influence over there-selection process. 
See BLAIR, supra note 5, at 13. 
202CAPPELLETTI, supra note 11, at 138. 
203BLAIR, supra note 5, at 22. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. at 24. 
2°6 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1017. 
207 !d. 
208 !d. 
209 !d. 
210Kommers, supra note 53, at 842. 
211 Zeidler, supra note 40, at 521. 
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2. Jurisdiction 
The decisions of the Constitutional Court are final and binding on 
all other courts.212 No other court, not even a high federal court, is 
empowered to declare a statute unconstitutional; this power is reserved 
exclusively for the Constitutional Court.213 Unlike the United States 
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court has no appellate jurisdic-
tion.214 When, however, a conflict exists between state and federal law 
and when the integrity of the German Constitution is at stake, the 
Federal Constitutional Court has jurisdiction.215 The Court's jurisdic-
tion is compulsory; it may not avoid decision in a case properly before 
it by invoking a "political question" doctrine or other "passive vir-
tues. "216 
3. The Functions of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court has several functions which signifY m~or 
facets of constitutional jurisdiction in Germany. 217 The wide-ranging 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court has its basis in many different 
articles of the Basic Law.218 The relevant items are listed together in 
Section 13 of the detailed Federal Constitutional Court Act by which 
the Constitutional Court was established.219 First, the court has the 
power to determine and apply the hierarchy of legal norms. 220 Second, 
the Constitutional Court is responsible for the protection of federal-
ism.221 Third, the Court has the power to intervene in disputes between 
the constitutional organs of the Federal Republic which necessitate an 
212 Kommers, supra note 53, at 840. 
213 !d. 
214 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1016. 
210Jd. 
216 Kommers, supra note 53, at 842. The Supreme Court, for prudential reasons, may decline 
to exercise jurisdiction that it possesses. !d. at 842 n.16. This difference between the United States 
and German tribunals should not be exaggerated. !d. Even though the Constitutional Court may 
not formally decline jurisdiction that it possesses, it has, in highly charged "political" cases, 
delayed handing down its decision, even for years, in the hope that the moving party will 
eventually withdraw the case. Jd. 
217 See GLENDON, supra note 37, at 94. 
2l8 BLAIR, supra note 5, at 10. 
219 Jd. 
220 See GLENDON, supra note 37, at 94. The Constitution is the supreme law, followed by federal 
law which supersedes state law. !d. 
221 See id. at 95. 
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interpretation of the Basic Law ensuring the separation of powers.222 
Fourth, the Constitutional Court ensures protection of human rights.223 
Any person who claims that one of his basic rights has been violated 
by public authority may file a complaint of unconstitutionality.224 Fifth, 
the Court has "concrete norm control" (konkrete Normenkontrolle) 
jurisdiction.225 Judges presiding over the regular judiciary may not 
declare laws unconstitutional, but if they regard as unconstitutional a 
law which is relevant to their decision, they shall refer the constitu-
tional issue to the Constitutional Court.226 Once the latter decides the 
issue, the lower court may proceed with the case.227 Sixth, the Court is 
authorized to declare political parties unconstitutional if they seek to 
impair the democratic order or endanger the existence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany.22s 
4. Roles and Restrictions of the Constitutional Court 
The dual role of the Constitutional Court as both a political body 
and a court of justice, expressly acknowledged in the Act on the 
Federal Constitutional Court, arises from the nature of its duties.229 
First, judicial review by a constitutional court is unavoidably, necessar-
ily, and legitimately a task burdened with political implications and 
effects. 230 Because politics and law are complementary functions, it 
follows that there can be no such thing as a complete separation of 
judicial and political power.231 Second, the members of the court per-
ceive their role as requiring them to apply the law and not to make 
it.232 Third, the Constitutional Court is specifically and exclusively a 
constitutional court, not an integral part of the ordinary judicial sys-
tem.233 
222 See id. This is known as "Organstreit." Id. 
223 See GLENDON, supra note 37, at 95. 
224 See id. 
225Kommers, supra note 53, at 841. 
226 !d. 
221 Jd. 
22s Jd. 
229 See Denninger, supra note 44, at 1024-25. 
230 !d. at 1024. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. Problems arise when the court decides an issue that does not concern the essence of 
the case. !d. Whenever it does so, the court produces substantial dicta, the legal status of which 
remains ambiguous under German law. Denninger, supra note 44, at 1024. 
233 !d. at 1024-25. 
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The Federal Constitutional Court functions more as a political body 
than the United States Supreme Court. 234 The United States would 
have denied review in nearly all of the important cases which the 
German Constitutional Court heard through a specific procedure 
called the "abstract review of statutes. "235 This review is used when there 
are divergent opinions about the compatibility of federal or state law 
with the Basic Law or the compatibility of state law with other federal 
law. 236 This proceeding does not involve adversarial litigation because 
there is no injury in fact to ensure standing and justiciability.237 The 
potential applicants are limited to the federal government, the state 
government, or one-third of the members of the federal Parliament.238 
Thus, the function of this procedure is to provide a weapon for the 
defeated parliamentary minority because it permits the political oppo-
sition to continue to oppose legislation before the court, even after its 
adoption by the majority, signature by the Federal President, and 
official promulgation.239 
Like the United States Supreme Court, the German Constitutional 
Court will not render merely advisory opinions. 240 Passionately dis-
puted political issues have come before the court through the "abstract 
review" procedure, and this has resulted in serious public repercus-
sions.241 The public's image of the court as a political arbiter has been 
reinforced by these events.242 
B. The United States Supreme Court 
1. The Structure of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court consists of nine justices. 243 Ordinarily, formal 
Court decisions are made by the full nine members, but on occasion, 
234 See id. at 1025. 
235 /d. at 1025-26; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (declaring that a litigant must 
have standing to invoke the power of a federal court). This is known in Germany as the "abstrakte 
Normenkontrolle." Denninger, supra note 44, at 1026. 
236 !d. 
237 See id. 
238 /d. 
239 See id. 
240 See Denninger, supra note 44, at 1026. 
241 See id. The disputed political issues which the German Constitutional Court has decided 
include the referenda on nuclear arms, the dispute on the issue of federal television, the abortion 
case, and many others. See id. 
242 See id. 
243 See FARBER, supra note 84, at 74. The number ofjustices was changed several times during 
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fewer than nine justices sit on a case.244 When only eight justices 
participate in a decision on the merits of a case, the Court may divide 
four to four. 245 In the case of a tie vote, the decision of the lower court 
is left standing.246 A quorum for a decision on a case is six members. 247 
The Court seldom fails to achieve a quorum, but this failure, like a tie 
vote, results in affirmance of the lower court decisions.248 
The Constitution requires that members of the Supreme Court be 
nominated by the President and confirmed by a majority of the Sen-
ate. 249 It also establishes that they will hold office "during good behav-
ior. "250 Thus, they serve for life unless they relinquish their posts vol-
untarily or are removed by impeachment proceedings.251 Beyond these 
basic rules, such issues as the number of justices, their qualifications 
and their duties have been settled by law and tradition, rather than 
specified in the Constitution.252 
2. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be divided into two 
parts. 253 First, the Constitution gives the Supreme Court original juris-
diction over certain specified classes of cases as a trial court. 254 The 
Court's original jurisdiction includes some cases to which a state is a 
party and cases involving ambassadors.255 Second, under its appellate 
jurisdiction, the Court may hear cases brought by parties dissatisfied 
with decisions of the federal courts of appeals and the specialized 
appellate courts in the federal system.256 The Court may hear cases 
the Court's first century. BAUM, supra note 183, at 13. The final change to nine members was 
made in 1869, and the Court has remained at that size; any further changes appear unlikely. ld. 
244 ld. 
245 Id. at 14. 
246 ld. 
247BAUM, supra note 183, at 14. 
24R !d. In two related cases in 1983, four justices disqualified themselves, and the court could 
not act. See Arizona v. United States Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983); Arizona v. Ash Grove 
Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983). 
249 U.S. CaNST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2; BAUM, supra note 183, at 13. 
250 U.S. CaNST., art. III, § 1; BAUM, supra note 183, at 13. 
25! BAuM, supra note 183, at 13. 
252 !d. 
253 Id. at 9. 
254 ld. 
255 ld. Relatively few cases come to the Supreme Court in this way. BAUM, supra note 183, at 9. 
256 fd. 
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brought directly from the district courts in certain cases in which an 
act of Congress was held unconstitutional.257 
3. The Roles and Restrictions of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court is bound by the principle of stare decisis. 258 
Under this principle, once the Supreme Court has made a decision, it 
will follow that decision in future cases and not overrule it.259 In Feder-
alist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton provided a rationale for this princi-
ple.260 He stated, "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is 
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and 
precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every 
particular case that comes before them. "261 
But stare decisis is not an absolute rule, and in constitutional cases 
in this century, the Supreme Court has adopted a relaxed approach. 262 
The Supreme Court generally believes that stare decisis is a wise policy; 
but, in constitutional cases where correction through legislative action 
is practically impossible, the Court has often overruled its earlier deci-
sions.263 
V. A CoMPARISON OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM OF JuDICIAL 
REVIEW WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES 
A realistic comparison of the laws of Germany and the United States 
cannot be effected simply by contrasting the meanings of a couple of 
rules or the operations of different institutions.264 Similarly, the institu-
tions of judicial review cannot be adequately compared without ana-
lyzing the respective social and political frameworks. 265 The German 
Constitutional Court is more reluctant to test the outer limits of its 
power than the United States Supreme Court, which essentially estab-
lished its own power of judicial review.266 The history of Germany has 
257 !d. 
258 See FARBER, supra note 84, at 57. This is Latin for "let the decisions stand." /d. 
259 /d. 
260 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
261 /d. 
262 See FARBER, supra note 84, at 57. 
263 See id. (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, 
]., dissenting)). 
264 Denninger, supra note 44, at 1013. 
265 See id. 
266 See GLENDON, supra note 37, at 117. 
150 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX, No. 1 
furnished the Germans with a commitment to the Rule of Law as the 
best protection against tyranny, and judicial power is deeply rooted in 
Germany's Basic Law.267 
The system of judicial review in the United States is distinguished 
from that of Germany by several factors. 268 First, the U.S. Constitution 
can be and is enforced by the Supreme Court and ordinary courts as 
part of the everyday process of adjudication of disputes. 269 Second, the 
Supreme Court and other courts are granted power at all levels to 
decide questions that require the kind of choice among policies and 
values, or the kind of commitment of public funds, that other countries 
prefer to leave to the democratic alternative-majority rule as ex-
pressed through many imperfectly representative assemblies.270 
Third, the "constitutionalization" of a great many legal issues often 
halts the legislative process for resolving these issues. 271 Once the Su-
preme Court has decided that certain rights are constitutionally pro-
tected, the underlying social controversy does not come to an end.272 
But it can no longer proceed along the lines of bargaining and per-
suasion within the state legislatures and among citizens.273 
It is difficult to overturn decisions based on constitutional interpre-
tation.274 Nonetheless, Congress has two avenues with which to reverse 
a constitutional decision or at least reduce its effects.275 First, if the 
Court has nullified a statute on constitutional grounds, Congress can 
write a second statute to try to meet the Court's objectives.276 Second, 
Congress can overturn decisions directly by constitutional amend-
ment.277 The constitutional decisions that Congress has acted to over-
267 See id.; Denninger, supra note 44, at 1014--15. 
268GLF.NDON, supra note 37, at 117. 
269 /d. 
270 /d. 
271 /d. 
272Jd. 
273 GLENDON, supra note 37, at 117. 
274 See BAVM, supra note 183, at 215. 
275 /d. 
276 /d. For example, in 1916 Congress used its power over interstate commerce to limit the 
employment of child labor. ld. In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the Court held 
that the commerce power was inadequate for this purpose. /d. In response, Congress adopted a 
new child labor statute in 1919 based on the taxing power. BAUM, supra note 183, at 215. The 
Court rejected this reasoning as well in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 ( 1922), and 
the effort to prohibit child labor failed. ld. In another example, after the Supreme Court struck 
down six major New Deal statutes in 1935 and 1936, Congress rewrote five of the laws. /d. at 
215-16. Four of the five were upheld by the Court after its collective change of heart in 1937, 
and the fifth was not challenged. /d. at 216. 
277 /d. Congress formally has proposed and sent to the states amendments to reverse Supreme 
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turn are only a small proportion of those that aroused congressional 
displeasure; this small proportion reflects the difficulty of the amend-
ment process.278 The law in the area can also possibly change through 
reversal or gradual erosion of the Supreme Court's decision. 279 Such 
reversal or gradual erosion is more likely to occur in the German 
Constitutional Courts because judges serve fixed terms, and they are 
not bound by their own decisions.280 
In the American federal context, judicial review occurs exclusively 
after the law or action has been promulgated or taken effect (a poste-
riori) and only as a result of the involvement of litigants in a concrete 
case or controversy. 281 But, in Germany, judicial review can be exercised 
in the abstract, in the absence of an actual case or controversy stimu-
lating its exercise.282 It seems that the Constitutional Court, which can 
engage in a priori review, would appear to have the maximum potential 
for policy influence using constitutional review. 283 On the other hand, 
a posteriori concrete review has hardly relegated the United States 
Supreme Court to a minor policy role.284 
Court decisions at least five times. BAUM, supra note 183, at 216. The Eleventh Amendment, which 
broadened state immunity from lawsuits, overturned Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 
(1793). !d. The Fourteenth Amendment, which upheld the right of citizenship for black persons, 
nullified part of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). !d. The Sixteenth 
Amendment, allowing a federal income tax, reversed Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 
U.S. 429 (1894). !d. In 1924, Congress proposed the Child Labor Amendment to overcome the 
Court's rulings that Congress lacked the power to regulate child labor. !d. This amendment, 
however, was not ratified by the states. BAUM, supra note 183, at 216. Finally, the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment nullified the Court's limitation on congressional power to reduce the legal voting 
age in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). !d. 
278 !d. Members of Congress are hesitant to tamper with the Constitution, especially to limit 
the protections of civil liberties in the Bill of Rights, and the requirement of a two-thirds majority 
in each house presents a formidable obstacle to action. !d. 
279 GLENDON, supra note 37, at 117. This rarely happens because the Court is bound by the 
principle of stare decisis. See FARBER, supra note 84, at 57. 
280 See Zeidler, supra note 40, at 521. 
281 Tate, supra note 1, at 6. 
282 See id. 
283 !d. 
284 !d. at 7. The Supreme Court has, throughout its history, made major policy decisions in 
many controversial areas. See BAUM, supra note 183, at 197. For example, in 1954, the Supreme 
Court decided Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, No. 1, which abolished separate schools for 
black and white students. 347 U.S. 483, 485--88 (1954). In Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203,205 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,422-25 (1962), the Supreme Court ruled 
that public schools could not hold prayer and Bible-reading exercises for their students. Finally, 
in search and seizure cases, Mapp v. Ohio applied to the states the "exclusionary rule," under 
which evidence illegally seized by the police could not be used against a defendant in state courts. 
See367 U.S. 643, 658-60 (1961). 
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Another distinction important to understanding judicial review in-
volves the extensiveness of the practice.285 The United States employs 
the "all courts" model.286 Any court may exercise judicial review, and a 
declaration of unconstitutionality on the part of a lower court judge 
need not be approved by any higher authority to be effective.287 Al-
though cases can be appealed to the Supreme Court, the policy 
influence of the judiciary is maximized in the United States because 
all courts can review constitutional questions.288 In Germany, judicial 
review is exercised only by a specially designated court.289 This is the 
constitutional court model.290 Restricting the power to declare legisla-
tion and regulations unconstitutional to a constitutional court might 
increase the breadth of the typical constitutional questions posed to 
the courts, but it also sharply reduces the number of occasions and 
range of policy issues on which the courts can exercise judicial re-
view.291 
The competence of the Constitutional Court in federal matters is, 
in some respects, wider than that of the Supreme Court. 292 It has many 
roles that the Supreme Court does not assume in that it can determine 
political questions as well as engage in abstract review.293 But, in an-
other respect, the jurisdiction is much narrower. 294 It is solely a consti-
tutional court. 295 It is designed to adjudicate upon all constitutional 
questions, but only upon constitutional questions.296 It is not a general 
court of final appeal, like the Supreme Court.297 
The source and authority of the Federal Constitutional Court are 
relatively undisputed.298 In the United States, by contrast, the main task 
of constitutional theory is to find and establish the source and the 
limits of judicial review.299 Marbury v. Madison inaugurated this effort, 
but the glaring deficiencies of Marshall's reasoning have prompted a 
2HSTate, supra note 1, at 7. 
2R6 Jd. 
2R7 !d. However, the judgment may be appealed. !d. 
2HR Jd. 
2R9Tate, supra note 1, at 7. 
290 !d. 
291 !d. 
292 See BLAIR, supra note 5, at 11. 
293 See id. 
294 !d. 
295 !d. 
296 !d. 
2''7 See BLAIR, supra note 5, at 11. 
29H Kommers, supra note 53, at 842. 
299 !d. 
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perennial search in the United States for a more convincing theory of 
when and why the judiciary should invalidate the acts of elected 
officials.300 This situation presents a dramatic irony.301 On the one hand, 
judicial review is one of the hallmarks of American constitutionalism.302 
On the other hand, there is no convincing theoretical explanation of 
where the Supreme Court's power comes from and how it should be 
used.303 The Supreme Court asserted its own power of judicial review, 
and although it engages in such review without objection, there is no 
concrete source in the Constitution that grants this power explicitly. 
Supplying the explanation for judicial review has become one focus of 
American constitutional theory.304 
Even with an explicit granting of the power of judicial review, there 
is still some controversy in Germany over the role of the Federal 
Constitutional Court. 305 Judicial nullification of majoritarian policy 
draws as much fire in Germany as in the United States.306 The differ-
ence is that the fire in Germany is directed against government agen-
cies or party leaders who would resort to constitutional litigation for 
essentially political ends.307 The Court is vilified only when it appears 
to cooperate in the achievement of these ends.308 Nevertheless, the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, a problem of judicial review in America, 
is not a major problem in Germany. 309 The Basic Law itself resolves the 
difficulty, for no reliance on a theory of judicial review is necessary to 
justify the exercise of judicial power.310 
The countermajoritarian difficulty does arise in Germany to the 
extent that the Federal Constitutional Court decides cases on the basis 
of historical and functional considerations. 311 The Court has invoked 
theories of its own creation, including the notion of an "objective order 
of values. "312 This is the basis on which the Court has struck down a 
300 !d. 
301 !d. 
302 !d. 
303 Kommers, supra note 53, at 842. 
304 Jd. at 842-43; see generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); ROBERT 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); and JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
305 See Kommers, supra note 53, at 843. 
306 !d. 
307 Jd. 
30B See id. This is one of the hazards, incidentally, of the abstract judicial review proceeding. !d. 
309 Kommers, supra note 53, at 843. 
310 !d. 
311Jd. 
31 2 !d. The Justices of the Constitutional Court have not only postulated an objective order of 
values; they have also arranged these values in a hierarchical order crowned by the principle of 
human dignity. !d. at 860. 
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number of important statutes, including a liberal abortion law.313 Some 
of these decisions have invited the objection, familiar to Americans, 
that justices are doing little more than imposing their own personal 
values on the nation as a whole.314 
The exercise of judicial review in Germany is somewhat less prob-
lematic than in the United States.315 First, the Parliament, not the 
executive, elects each justice by a two-thirds vote for a single nonre-
newable term of twelve years. 316 This averts the rise of an aging judicial 
oligarchy out of touch with the modern world.317 Supreme Court jus-
tices, on the other hand, serve a life term, and this often prevents the 
Supreme Court from growing and changing.318 
Second, in Germany, there is a set of generally agreed-upon ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation.319 These approaches might 
be brought together under the general heading of "constitutional 
textualism. "320 The code law tradition, with its emphasis on specific 
norms and structures, leads to legal positivism in adjudication, and the 
Constitutional Court often talks as if it is strictly adhering to the 
constitutional text. 321 But the Court also employs systematic and tele-
ological modes of inquiry.322 The focus is often on the text as a whole 
from which judges are to ascertain the aims and objects, or telos, of 
the Constitution, a style of reasoning that allows judges to incorporate 
broad value judgments into their decisions.323 
The Constitutional Court uses history to confirm judgments arrived 
at on the basis of teleological reasoning. 324 Original intent, on the other 
hand, or the subjective understanding of the Framers, plays no sig-
:m Kommers, supra note 53, at 843-44. The Court struck down a liberalized abortion statute 
in 1975. See Abortion Case, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975). 
314 Kommers, supra note 53, at 844. Today, the Court is more inclined to speak of the value 
system inherent in the Basic Law. /d. at 861. The objective values of the Basic Law define a way 
of life to which the German people, as a nation, are committed. /d. The task of the Court in 
adjudicating constitutional controversies is one of integrating these objective values into the 
common culture and common conscientiousness of the German people. /d. 
315 /d. 
316 Kommers, supra note 53, at 844. 
317 /d. 
318 See BAUM, supra note 183, at 13. 
319 Kommers, supra note 53, at 844. 
320 /d. 
321 /d. 
322 /d. 
323 /d. These judgments resemble the Supreme Court's substantive due process decisions. 
Kommers, supra note 53, at 844. 
324 See id. at 845. 
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nificant role in German constitutional interpretation.325 In the United 
States, on the other hand, original intent and the weight it should be 
given in constitutional adjudication is a hotly contested issue.326 This 
leads to more uncertainty when reaching decisions.327 In both courts, 
however, it seems that judges are often able to impose their value 
judgments on the decisions rendered because they can usually inter-
pret the law in accordance with these values.328 
The Constitutional Court, unlike the Supreme Court, is not bound 
by the rule of stare decisis. 329 In the culture of Germany's code law 
world, with the exception of decisions of the Constitutional Court, 
judicial decisions do not enjoy the status of law as in the common law 
world.330 While the Constitutional Court has spun a complicated web 
of doctrine around the Basic Law, and while opinions cite many earlier 
cases, judges can more easily maintain the fiction that they are inter-
preting the documentary text rather than building upon their own 
precedents.331 Moreover, the Constitutional Court is not bound by its 
own decisions. 332 
Some people have suggested that constitutional review by the United 
States Supreme Court has harmful consequences for "normal poli-
tics. "333 The claim is that the institution of judicial review tends to 
remove questions of principle from the political process.334 The exist-
ence of judicial review may cause legislatures to more readily shed the 
consideration of constitutional restraints.335 Because the Supreme 
Court has allocated to itself the power of judicial review, Congress does 
not need to scrutinize whether or not it is violating the Constitution.336 
Despite such an opportunity, it is unrealistic to assume that judicial 
review has a significant adverse impact on Congress' sense of moral 
responsibility and adherence to the Constitution.337 
325 See id. 
326 See id. 
327 See id. 
328 See Kommers, supra note 53, at 845. 
329 /d. 
330 /d. In reality, courts usually do follow their own decisions. See id. 
331 /d. 
332 Zeidler, supra note 40, at 521. 
333 STONE, supra note 90, at 37. 
334 /d. 
335 /d. 
336 See id. 
337 See id. 
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The Supreme Court differs from the Constitutional Court in that 
the capacity of the Supreme Court to hear and resolve cases has not 
kept pace with the increasing volume of petitions.338 This results in 
discretionary case selection which allows the Court to decide for itself 
the degree to which it will become involved in confrontations among 
the various branches and levels of government.339 The prominence of 
the Supreme Court means that its case-selection decisions will either 
add to or detract from its public image.340 The possibility of refusing 
decision can protect the Court from issuing politically damaging deci-
sions on the merits. 341 However, this opportunity for sidestepping 
conflict must be exercised with circumspection.342 If the Court is per-
ceived as ducking issues by denying review, its popular acceptance will 
suffer. 343 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The systems of judicial review employed by the Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Court differ significantly. It cannot be stated that 
one system is better than the other because each serves an important 
role within its own governmental framework. Both systems have their 
positive and negative attributes. 
The power of judicial review, as exercised by the Supreme Court, 
does not have a specific and concrete source. But this power is essential 
because it enables the Court to declare invalid that legislation which 
conflicts with the Constitution. There is a danger, however, that be-
cause the justices are not elected, they will not conform to society's 
values. And because it is very difficult to overturn a Supreme Court 
decision, unwanted values may be imposed on American citizens. 
Also, the role of the German Constitutional Court in developing a 
stable republic based on law and justice is important.344 Although the 
Court's role is positive, some risks remain.345 The most serious risk is 
that an autocratic administration of justice might dangerously narrow 
the concept of pluralism to a monistic view of civic values. 346 Such a 
338 See PROVINE, supra note 175, at 1. 
339 !d. at 1-2. 
340 See id. at 2. 
341 See id. 
342 See id. 
343 See PROVINE, supra note 175, at 2-3. 
344Denninger, supra note 44, at 1031. 
345 !d. 
346 !d. 
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constricted perception of values, if practiced by the Constitutional 
Court, might suffocate the delicate flowering of democracy, offreedom 
of speech, and of active citizenship, which in Germany needs more 
intense care than in the democracy of the United States.347 
Although there are risks in the powers of judicial review that are 
exercised by the Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court, 
there are dangers inherent in the notion of judicial review itself. 
Germany and the United States both implemented systems of judicial 
review based on their respective histories and governments. To say that 
the system in Germany should be replaced by the decentralized system 
of judicial review would be inaccurate and implausible. Granting the 
power of judicial review to a court will inevitably carry with it certain 
risks in any country. But judicial review in both Germany and the 
United States arose out of historical fears, and these fears enabled the 
countries to develop systems of judicial review that were best suited for 
their citizens. 
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